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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of this court is conferred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(a), which provides in pertinent part that the 
court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction over "the final or-
ders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of themf.]" 
-iii-
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from final older if the Salt Like \ uunt
 ( 
Board of Appeals | j iding and Zoning). The Board denied the pe-
titioner's requests that Salt Lake County complete properly an 
inspection of *in oltice building puichased by the petitioner, and 
that the County extend the time for vacating the building pursu-
ant to an order to vacate, Sincp ("be tilinq if tlin d<«keting 
st iteiient iwiUi Hi is court, the petitioner has vacated the build-
ing. Thus, the question of time extension is moot for the pur-
poses of this appeu I I i ippedJ ib IIIUW limited to the peti-
tioner's request for a properly completed, inspection. 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The court of appeals has jurisdiction of initial review 
of the final order of the Salt Lake County Board of Appeals. 
II. The district court's denial of a writ of mandamus to 
compel further building inspection is not dispositive of the 
question of whether Salt Lake County has abused its discretion in 
refusing to complete properly an inspection of the petitioner's 
building. 
III. The superficial relationship between this petition for 
review and a pending civil action arising out of the same facts 
does not warrant a stay of the petition. 
IV. Salt Lake County abused its discretion in administering 
the building code when it denied the petitioner proper completion 
of a building inspection that the County had voluntarily under-
taken and improperly performed. 
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STATUTES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINABLE ON THE DECISION 
A. Constitution 
Utah Const, art, VIIJ„ k 7, repealed by general elect! on on 
November i I M M iPtferf ive July J r»HS | lurisdicti m ul Ins-
trict Courts,| 
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in thi^ 
Constitution, and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the san|e. The District 
Courts or any judge thereof, shall nave power to issue 
writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo war-
ranto, certiorari, prohibition and other writs neces-
sary to carry into effect their orders, judgments and 
decrees, and to give them a general control over in-
ferior courts and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
Utah Const, \rt *n 1 "J* '* r f *" '! I- "' I 1 Ju i isd t L 11 ,n . t 
District Court dihJ Of hex Courts—Right of Appeal.] 
'Ihe district court shall have original jurisdiction 
in all matters except as limited by this constitution 
or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall havfe appellate juris-
diction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction ut 
all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed origin-
ally with the supreme court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
over the cause. 
B. Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. <* >8-2a-l(2) (Supp 1986) [Court of Appeals 
Jurisdiction.] 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, OVPT 
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(a) the final orders and decrees of state and local 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
them, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining, and the state engineer, notwithstanding any 
other provision of law; 
(b) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(c) appeals from the circuit courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record 
in criminal cases except those involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from district court in criminal cases 
except those involving a conviction of a first or capi-
tal degree felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs involving a criminal conviction, except 
those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support 
and visitation, adoption, and paternity; and 
(h) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4, repealed bv Utah Laws 1986, ch. 47, 
§ 50. [Jurisdiction of District Court—Original and Appellate.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the 
Constitution and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the same. The district 
courts, or any judges thereof, shall have power to 
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments 
and decrees, and to give them a general control over 
inferior courts and tribunals within their respective 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (Supp. 1986) [Jurisdiction of District 
Court—Transfer of Cases to Circuit Court—Appeals.] 
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(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in 
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding 
officer of the judicial council and subject to policies 
established by the judicial council, cases filed in the 
district court, which are also within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred 
to the circuit court by the presiding judge of the dis-
trict court in multiple judge districts, or the dis-
trict court judge in single judge districts. The 
transfer of these cases may be made upon the court's 
own motion or upon the motion of either party for ad-
judication. When an order is made transferring a case, 
the court shall transmit the pleadings and papers to 
the circuit court to which the case is transferred. 
The circuit court has the same jurisdiction as if the 
case had been originally commenced in the circuit court 
and any appeals from final judgments shall be to the 
Court of Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and 
decrees of the district court are under §§ 78-2-2 and 
78-2a-3. 
C. Ordinances 
Salt Lake County, Utah. Rev. Ordinances tit. II, ch. 1 (as 
amended 1966). 
Note: Salt Lake County has adopted the Uniform Building 
Code (1982 ed.) with amendments. In the following listing of 
pertinent sections the Uniform Building Code (U.B.C.) provisions 
appear first, and the amendments follow asj notes. 
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1982 EDITION 101-104 
Parti 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
Chapter 1 
TITLE, SCOPE AND GENERAL 
Title 
Sec, 101. These regulations shall be known as the "Uniform Building Code," 
may be cited as such and will be referred to herein as "this code." 
Purpose 
Sec. 102. The purpose of this code is to provide minimum standards to 
safeguard life or limb, health, property and public welfare by regulating and 
controlling the design, construction, quality of materials, use and occupancy, 
location and maintenance of all buildings and structures within this jurisdiction 
and certain equipment specifically regulated herein. 
Scope 
Sec. 103. The provisions of this code shall apply to the construction, alteration, 
moving, demolition, repair and use of any building or structure within this 
jurisdiction, except work located primarily in a public way, public utility towers 
and poles, mechanical equipment not specifically regulated in this code, and 
hydraulic flood control structures. 
Additions, alterations, repairs and changes of use or occupancy in all buildings 
and structures shall comply with the provisions for new buildings and structures 
except as otherwise provided in Sections 104, 307 and 502 of this code. 
Where, in any specific case, different sections of this code specify different 
materials, methods of construction or other requirements, the most restrictive 
shall govern. Where there is a conflict between a general requirement and a 
specific requirement, the specific requirement shall be applicable. 
Wherever in this code reference is made to the appendix, the provisions in the 
appendix shall not apply unless specifically adopted. 
Application to Existing Buildings and Structures 
Sec. 104. (a) General. Buildings and structures to which additions, alterations 
or repairs are made shall comply with all the requirements of this code for new 
facilities except as specifically provided in this section. See Section 1210 for 
provisions requiring installation of smoke detectors in existing Group R, Division 
3 Occupancies. 
(b) Additions, Alterations or Repairs. Additions, alterations or repairs may 
be made to any building or structure without requiring the existing building or 
structure to comply with all the requirements of this code, provided the addition, 
alteration or repair conforms to that required for a new building or structure. 
Additions, alterations or repairs shall not cause an existing building or structure to 
become unsafe or overloaded. Any building so altered, which involves a change 
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in use or occupancy, shall not exceed the height, number of stories and area 
permitted for new buildings. Any building plus new additions shall not exceed the 
height, number of stories and area specified for new buildings. 
Alterations or repairs to an existing building or structure which are nonstruc-
tural and do not adversely affect any structural member or any part of the building 
or structure having required fire resistance may be made with the same materials 
of which the building or structure is constructed. 
EXCEPTION: The installation or replacement of glass shall be as required for 
new installations. 
(c) Existing Installations. Buildings in existence at the time of the adoption of 
this code may have their existing use or occupancy continued, if such use or 
occupancy was legal at the time of the adoption of this cod^, provided such 
continued use is not dangerous to life. 
Any change in the use or occupancy of any existing building or structure shall 
comply with the provisions of Sections 307 and 502 of this code. 
For existing buildings, see Appendix Chapter 1. 
(d) Maintenance. All buildings and structures, both existing and new, and all 
parts thereof, shall be maintained in a safe and sanitary condition. All devices or 
safeguards which are required by this code shall be maintained in conformance 
with the code edition under which installed. The owner or his designated agent 
shall be responsible for the maintenance of buildings and structures. To determine 
compliance with this subsection, the building official may cause any structure to 
be reinspected. 
(e) Moved Buildings and Temporary Buildings. Buildings or structures 
moved into or within the jurisdiction shall comply with the provisions of this code 
for new buildings or structures. 
Temporary structures such as reviewing stands and other miscellaneous struc-
tures, sheds, canopies or fences used for the protection of the public around and in 
conjunction with construction work may be erected by special permit from the 
building official for a limited period of time. Such buildings or structures need not 
comply with the type of construction or fire-resistive time periods required by this 
code. Temporary buildings or structures shall be completely removed upon the 
expiration of the time limit stated in the permit. 
(f) Historic Buildings. Repairs, alterations and additions necessary for the 
preservation, restoration, rehabilitation or continued use of a building or structure 
may be made without conformance to all the requirements of this code when 
authorized by the building official, provided: 
1. The building or structure has been designated by official action of the 
legally constituted authority of this jurisdiction as having special historical 
or architectural significance. 
2. Any unsafe conditions as described in this code are corrected. 
3. The restored building or structure will be no more hazardous based on life 
safety, fire safety and sanitation than the existing building. 
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Alternate Materials and Methods of Construction 
Sec. 105. The provisions of this code are not intended to prevent the use of any 
material or method of construction not specifically prescribed by this code, 
provided any alternate has been approved and its use authorized by the building 
official. 
The building official may approve any such alternate, provided he finds that the 
proposed design is satisfactory and complies with the provisions of this code and 
that the material, method or work offered is, for the purpose intended, at least the 
equivalent of that prescribed in this code in suitability, strength, effectiveness, 
fire resistance, durability, safety and sanitation. 
The building official shall require that sufficient evidence or proof be submitted 
to substantiate any claims that may be made regarding its use. The details of any 
action granting approval of an alternate shall be recorded and entered in the files of 
the code enforcement agency. 
Modifications 
Sec. 106. Whenever there are practical difficulties involved in carrying out the 
provisions of this code, the building official may grant modifications for individu-
al cases, provided he shall first find that a special individual reason makes the 
strict letter of this code impractical and that the modification is in conformity with 
the intent and purpose of this code and that such modification does not lessen any 
fire protection requirements or any degree of structural integrity. The details of 
any action granting modifications shall be recorded and entered in the files of the 
code enforcement agency. 
Tests 
Sec. 107. Whenever there is insufficient evidence of compliance with any of 
the provisions of this code or evidence that any material or construction does not 
conform to the requirements of this code, the building official may require tests as 
proof of compliance to be made at no expense to this jurisdiction. 
Test methods shall be as specified by this code or by other recognized test 
standards. If there are no recognized and accepted test methods for the proposed 
alternate, the building official shall determine test procedures. 
All tests shall be made by an approved agency. Reports of such tests shall be 
retained by the building official for the period required for the retention of public 
records. 
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Chapter 2 
ORGANIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Creation of Enforcement Agency 
Sec. 20L There is hereby established in this jurisdiction a code enforcement 
agency which shall be under the administrative and operational control of the 
building official 
Powers and Duties of Building Official 
Sec. 202. (a) General. The building official is hereby authorized and directed 
to enforce all the provisions of this code. For such purposes, he shall have the 
powers of a law enforcement officer. 
(b) Deputies. In accordance with prescribed procedures and with the approval 
of the appointing authority, the building official may appoint a chief plans 
examiner, a chief building inspector and other related technical officers and 
inspectors and other employees as shall be authorized from time to time. 
(c) Right of Entry. Whenever necessary 10 make an inspection to enforce any 
of the provisions of this code, or whenever the building official or his authorized 
representative has reasonable cause to believe that there exists in any building or 
upon any premises any condition or code violation which makes such building or 
premises unsafe, dangerous or hazardous, the building official or his authorized 
representative may enter such building or premises at all reasonable times to 
inspect the same or to perform any duty imposed upon the building official by this 
code, provided that if such building or premises be occupied, he shall first present 
proper credentials and request entry; and if such building or premises be unoc-
cupied, he shall first make a reasonable effort to locate the owner or other persons 
having charge or control of the building or premises and request entry. If such 
entry is refused, the building official or his authorized representative shall have 
recourse to every remedy provided by law to secure entry. 
When the building official or his authorized representative shall have first 
obtained a proper inspection warrant or other remedy provided by law to secure 
entry, no owner or occupant or any other persons having charge, care or control of 
any building or premises shall fail or neglect, after proper request is made as 
herein provided, to promptly permit entry therein by the building official or his 
authorized representative for the purpose of inspection and examination pursuant 
to this code. 
(d) Stop Orders. Whenever any work is being done contrary to the provisions 
of this code, the building official may order the work stopped by notice in writing 
served on any persons engaged in the doing or causing such work to be done, and 
any such persons shall forthwith stop such work until authorized by the building 
official to proceed with the work. 
(e) Occupancy Violations. Whenever any building or structure or equipment 
therein regulated by this code is being used contrary to the provisions of this code, 
the building official may order such use discontinued and the structure, or portion 
thereof, vacated by notice served on any person causing such use to be continued. 
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Such person shall discontinue the use within the time prescribed by the building 
official after receipt of such notice to make the structure, or portion thereof, 
comply with the requirements of this code. 
(f) Liability. The building official, or his authorized representative charged 
with the enforcement of this code, acting in good faith and without malice in the 
discharge of his duties, shall not thereby render himself personally liable for any 
damage that may accrue to persons or property as a result of any act or by reason of 
any act or omission in the discharge of his duties. Any suit brought against the 
building official or employee because of such act or omission performed by him in 
the enforcement of any provision of this code shall be defended by legal counsel 
provided by this jurisdiction until final termination of such proceedings. 
This code shall not be construed to relieve from or lessen the responsibility of 
any person owning, operating or controlling any building or structure for any 
damages to persons or property caused by defects, nor shall the code enforcement 
agency or its parent jurisdiction be held as assuming any such liability by reason 
of the inspections authorized by this code or any certificates of inspection issued 
under this code. 
(g) Cooperation of Other Officials and Officers. The building official may 
request, and shall receive so far as is required in the discharge of his duties, the 
assistance and cooperation of other officials of this jurisdiction. 
Unsafe Buildings or Structures 
Sec. 203. All buildings or structures regulated by this code which are struc-
turally unsafe or not provided with adequate egress, or which constitute a fire 
hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life are, for the purpose of this 
section, unsafe. Any use of buildings or structures constituting a hazard to safety, 
health or public welfare by reason of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, 
obsolescence, fire hazard, disaster, damage or abandonment is, for the purpose of 
this section, an unsafe use. Parapet walls, cornices, spires, towers, tanks, statuary 
and other appendages or structural members which are supported by. attached to, 
or a part of a building and which are in deteriorated condition or otherwise unable 
to sustain the design loads which are specified in this code are hereby designated 
as unsafe building appendages. 
All such unsafe buildings, structures or appendages are hereby declared to be 
public nuisances and shall be abated by repair, rehabilitation, demolition or 
removal in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Dangerous Buildings 
Code or such alternate procedures, as may have been or as may be adopted by this 
jurisdiction. As an alternative, the building official, or other employee or official 
of this jurisdiction as designated by the governing body, may institute any other 
appropriate action to prevent, restrain, correct or abate the violation. 
Board of Appeals 
Sec. 204. In order to determine the suitability of alternate materials and 
methods of construction and to provide for reasonable interpretations of this code, 
there shall be and is hereby created a Board of Appeals consisting of members 
who are qualified by experience and training to pass upon matters pertaining to 
building construction. The building official shall be an ex officio member and 
29 
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shall act as secretary of the board. The Board of Appeals shall be appointed by the 
governing body and shall hold office at its pleasure. The board shall adopt 
reasonable rules and regulations for conducting its investigations and shall render 
all decisions and findings in writing to the building official with a duplicate copy 
to the appellant. 
Violations 
Sec 205. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect, 
construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, improve, remove, convert or demolish, 
equip, use, occupy or maintain any building or structure or cause or permit the 
same to be done in violation of this code. 
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Chapter 3 
PERMITS AND INSPECTIONS 
Permits 
Sec. 301. (a) Permits Required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or 
corporation to erect, construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, improve, remove, 
convert or demolish any building or structure regulated by this code, except as 
specified in Subsection (b) of this section, or cause the same to be done without 
first obtaining a separate permit for each building or structure from the building 
official. 
(b) Exempted Work. A building permit shall not be required for the following: 
1. One-story detached accessory buildings used as tool and storage sheds, 
playhouses and similar uses, provided the projected roof area does not 
exceed 120 square feet. 
2. Fences not over 6 feet high. 
3. Oil derricks. 
4. Movable cases, counters and partitions not over 5 feet high. 
5. Retaining walls which are not over 4 feet in height measured from the 
bottom of the footing to the top of the wall, unless supporting a surcharge 
or impounding flammable liquids. 
6. Water tanks supported directly upon grade if the capacity does not exceed 
5000 gallons and the ratio of height to diameter or width does not exceed 
two to one. 
7. Platforms, walks and driveways not more than 30 inches above grade and 
not over any basement or story below. 
8. Painting, papering and similar finish work. 
9. Temporary motion picture, television and theater stage sets and scenery. 
10. Window awnings supported by an exterior wall of Group R, Division 3, 
and Group M Occupancies when projecting not more than 54 inches. 
11. Prefabricated swimming pools accessory to a Group R, Division 3 Occu-
pancy in which the pool walls are entirely above the adjacent grade and if 
the capacity does not exceed 5000 gallons. 
Unless otherwise exempted, separate plumbing, electrical and mechanical 
permits will be required for the above exempted items. 
Exemption from the permit requirements of this code shall not be deemed to 
grant authorization for any work to be done in any manner in violation of the 
provisions of this code or any other laws or ordinances of this jurisdiction. 
Application for Permit 
Sec. 302, (a) Application. To obtain a permit, the applicant shall first file an 
application therefor in writing on a form furnished by the code enforcement 
agency for that purpose. Every such application shall: 
1. Identify and describe the work to be covered by the permit for which 
application is made. 
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2. Describe the land on which the proposed work is to be done by legal 
description, street address or similar description that will readily identify and 
definitely locate the proposed building or work. 
3. Indicate the use or occupancy for which the proposed work is intended. 
4. Be accompanied by plans, diagrams, computations and specifications and 
other data as required in Subsection (b) of this section. 
5. State the valuation of any new building or structure or any addition, 
remodeling or alteration to an existing building. 
6. Be signed by permittee, or his authorized agent, who may be required to 
submit evidence to indicate such authority, j 
7. Give such other data and information as may be required by the building 
official 
(b) Plans and Specifications. Plans, engineering calculations, diagrams and 
other data shall be submitted in one or more sets with each application for a 
permit. The building official may require plans, computations and specifications 
to be prepared and designed by an engineer or architect licensed by the state to 
practice as such. 
EXCEPTION: The building official may waive the submission of plans, cal-
culations, etc., if he finds that the nature of the work applied for is such that 
reviewing of plans is not necessary to obtain compliance with this code. 
(c) Information on Plans and Specifications. Plans and specifications shall 
be drawn to scale upon substantial paper or cloth and shall be of sufficient clarity 
to indicate the location, nature and extent of the work proposed and show in detail 
that it will conform to the provisions of this code and all relevant laws, ordi-
nances, rules and regulations. I 
Plans for buildings more than two stories in height of other than Groups R, 
Division 3 and M Occupancies shall indicate how required structural and fire-
resistive integrity will be maintained where a penetration will be made for 
electrical, mechanical, plumbing and communication conduits, pipes and similar 
systems. i 
Permits issuance 
Sec. 303. (a) Issuance. The application, plans and specifications, and other 
data, filed by an applicant for permit shall be reviewed by the building official. 
Such plans may be reviewed by other departments of this jurisdiction to verify 
compliance with any applicable laws under their jurisdiction. If the building 
official finds that the work described in an application for a permit and the plans, 
specifications and other data filed therewith conform to the requirements of this 
code and other pertinent laws and ordinances, and that the fees specified in 
Section 304 have been paid, he shall issue a permit therefor to the applicant. 
When the building official issues the permit where plans are required, he shall 
endorse in writing or stamp the plans and specifications "APPROVED/1 Such 
approved plans and specifications shall not be changed, modified or altered 
without authorizations from the building pfficial, and all work shall be done in 
accordance with the approved plans. 
The building official may issue a permit for the construction of part of a 
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building or structure before the entire plans and specifications for the whole 
building or structure have been submitted or approved, provided adequate infor-
mation and detailed statements have been filed complying with all pertinent 
requirements of this code. The holder of such permit shall proceed at his own risk 
without assurance that the permit for the entire building or structure will be 
granted. 
(b) Retention of Plans. One set of approved plans, specifications and com-
putations shall be retained by the building official for a period of not less than 90 
days from date of completion of the work covered therein; and one set of approved 
plans and specifications shall be returned to the applicant, and said set shall be 
kept on the site of the building or work at all times during which the work 
authorized thereby is in progress. 
(c) Validity of Permit. The issuance or granting of a permit or approval of 
plans and specifications shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, 
any violation of any of the provisions of this code or of any other ordinance of the 
jurisdiction. No permit presuming to give authority to violate or cancel the 
provisions of this code shall be valid. 
The issuance of a permit based upon plans, specifications and other data shall 
not prevent the building official from thereafter requiring the correction of errors 
in said plans, specifications and other data, or from preventing building opera-
tions being carried on thereunder when in violation of this code or of any other 
ordinances of this jurisdiction. 
(d) Expiration. Every permit issued by the building official under the provi-
sions of this code shall expire by limitation and become null and void if the 
building or work authorized by such permit is not commenced within 180 days 
from the date of such permit, or if the building or work authorized by such permit 
is suspended or abandoned at any time after the work is commenced for a period 
of 180 days. Before such work can be recommenced, a new permit shall be first 
obtained so to do, and the fee therefor shall be one half the amount required for a 
new permit for such work, provided no changes have been made or will be made 
in the original plans and specifications for such work; and provided further that 
such suspension or abandonment has not exceeded one year. 
Any permittee holding an unexpired permit may apply for an extension of the 
time within which he may commence work under thar permit when he is unable to 
commence work within the time required by this section for good and satisfactory 
reasons. The building official may extend the time for action by the permittee for a 
period not exceeding 180 days upon written request by the permittee showing that 
circumstances beyond the control of the permittee have prevented action from 
being taken. No permit shall be extended more than once. In order to renew action 
on a permit after expiration, the permittee shall pay a new full permit fee. 
(e) Suspension or Revocation. The building official may, in writing, suspend 
or revoke a permit issued under the provisions of this code whenever the permit is 
issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information supplied, or in violation of 
any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code. 
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Fees 
Sec, 304. (a) Permit Fees. The fee for each permit shall be as set forth in Table 
No. 3-A. 
The determination of value or valuation under any of the provisions of this code 
shall be made by the building official The value to be used in computing the 
building permit and building plan review fees shall be the total value of all 
construction work for which the permit is issued as well as all finish work,-
painting, roofing, electrical, plumbing, heating, air conditioning, elevators, fire-
extinguishing systems and any other permanent equipment. 
(b) Plan Review Fees. When a plan or other data are required to be submitted 
by Subsection (b) of Section 302, a plan review fee shall be paid at the time of 
submitting plans and specifications for review. Said plan review fee shall be 65 
percent of the building permit fee as shown in Table No. 3-A. 
Where plans are incomplete or changed so as to require additional plan review, 
an additional plan review fee shall be charged at the rate shown in Table No. 3-A. 
(c) Expiration of Plan Review. Applications for which no permit is issued 
within 180 days following the date of application shall expire by limitation, and 
plans and other data submitted for review may thereafter be returned to the 
applicant or destroyed by the building official. The building official may extend 
the time for action by the applicant for a period not exceeding 180 days upon 
request by the applicant showing that circumstances beyond the control of the 
applicant have prevented action from being taken. No application shall be 
extended more than once. In order to renew action on an application after 
expiration, the applicant shall resubmit plans and pay a new plan review fee. 
(d) Investigation Fees: Work Without a Permit. 1. Investigation. Whenever 
any work for which a permit is required by this code has been commenced without 
first obtaining said permit, a special investigation shall be made before a permit 
may be issued for such work. 
2. Fee. An investigation fee, in addition to the permit fee, shall be collected 
whether or not a permit is then or subsequently issued. The investigation fee shall 
be equal to the amount of the permit fee required by this code. The minimum 
investigation fee shall be the same as the minimum fee set forth in Table No. 3-A. 
The payment of such investigation fee shall not exempt any person from compli-
ance with all other provisions of this code nor from any penalty prescribed by law. 
(e) Fee Refunds. 1. The building official may authorize the refunding of any 
fee paid hereunder which was erroneously paid or collected. 
2. The building official may authorize the refunding of not more than 80 
percent of the permit fee paid when no work has been done under a permit issued 
in accordance with this code. 
3. The building official may authorize the refunding of not more than 80 
percent of the plan review fee paid when an application for a permit for which a 
plan review fee has been paid is withdrawn or canceled before any plan reviewing 
is done. 
The building official shall not authorize the refunding of any fee paid except 
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upon written application filed by the original permittee not later than 180 days 
after the date of fee payment. 
Inspections 
Sec. 305, (a) General. All construction or work for which a permit is required 
shall be subject to inspection by the building official, and certain types of 
construction shall have continuous inspection by special inspectors as specified in 
Section 306. 
A survey of the lot may be required by the building official to verify that the 
structure is located in accordance with the approved plans. It shall be the duty of 
the permit applicant to cause the work to be accessible and exposed for inspection 
purposes. Neither the building official nor the jurisdiction shall be liable for 
expense entailed in the removal or replacement of any material required to allow 
inspection. 
(b) Inspection Requests. It shall be the duty of the person doing the work 
authorized by a permit to notify the building official that such work is ready for 
inspection. The building official may require that every request for inspection be 
filed at least one working day before such inspection is desired. Such request may 
be in writing or by telephone at the option of the building official. 
It shall be the duty of the person requesting any inspections required by this 
code to provide access to and means for proper inspection of such work. 
(c) Inspection Record Card. Work requiring a permit shall not be commenced 
until the permit holder or his agent shall have posted an inspection record card in a 
conspicuous place on the premises and in such position as to allow the building 
official conveniently to make the required entries thereon regarding inspection of 
the work. This card shall be maintained in such position by the permit holder until 
final approval has been granted by the building official. 
(d) Approval Required. No work shall be done on any part of the building or 
structure beyond the point indicated in each successive inspection without first 
obtaining the approval of the building official. Such approval shall be given only 
after an inspection shall have been made of each successive step in the con-
struction as indicated by each of the inspections required in Subsection (e). 
There shall be a final inspection and approval on all buildings and structures 
when completed and ready for occupancy or use. 
(e) Required Inspections. Reinforcing steel or structural framework of any 
part of any building or structure shall not be covered or concealed without first 
obtaining the approval of the building official. 
The building official, upon notification from the permit holder or his agent, 
shall make the following inspections and shall either approve that portion of the 
construction as completed or shall notify the permit holder or his agent wherein 
the same fails to comply with this code: 
1. FOUNDATION INSPECTION: To be made after trenches are excavated 
and forms erected and when all materials for the foundation are delivered on the 
job. Where concrete from a central mixing plant (commonly termed "transit 
mixed") is to be used, materials need not be on the job. 
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2. CONCRETE SLAB OR UNDEfc-FLOOR INSPECTION: To be made 
after all in-s!ab or under-floor building service equipment, conduit, piping 
accessories and other ancillary equipment items are in place but before any 
concrete is poured or floor sheathing installed, including the subfloor. 
3. FRAME INSPECTION: To be made after the roof, all framing, fire 
blocking and bracing are in place and all pipes, chimneys and vents are complete 
and the rough electrical, plumbing, and heating wires, pipes, and ducts are 
approved. 
4. LATH AND/OR GYPSUM BOARD INSPECTION: To be made after all 
lathing and gypsum board, interior and exterior, is in place but before any 
plastering is applied or before gypsum board joints and fasteners are taped and 
finished. 
5. FINAL INSPECTION: To be made after finish grading and the building is 
completed and ready for occupancy. 
(f) Other Inspections. In addition to the called inspections specified above, 
the building official may make or require other inspections of any construction 
work to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this code and other laws 
which are enforced by the code enforcement agency. 
(g) Reinspections. A reinspection fee may be assessed for each inspection or 
reinspection when such portion of work for which inspection is called is not 
complete or when corrections called for are not made. 
This subsection is not to be interpreted as requiring reinspection fees the first 
time a job is rejected for failure to comply with the requirements of this code, but 
as controlling the practice of calling for inspections before the job is ready for 
such inspection or reinspection. 
Reinspection fees may be assessed when the permit card is not properly posted 
on the work site, the approved plans are not readily available to the inspector, for 
failure to provide access on the date for which inspection is requested, or for 
deviating from plans requiring the approval of the building official. 
To obtain a reinspection, the applicant shall file an application therefor in 
writing upon a form furnished for that purpose and pay the reinspection fee in 
accordance with Table No. 3-A. 
In instances where reinspection fees have been assessed, no additional inspec-
tion of the work will be performed until the required fees have been paid. 
Special Inspections 
Sec. 306. (a) General. In addition to the inspections required by Section 305, 
the owner shall employ a special inspector during construction on the following 
types of work: 
1. CONCRETE: During the taking of test specimens and placing of all 
reinforced concrete and pneumatically placed concrete. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. Concrete for foundations conforming to minimum require-
ments of Table No. 29-A or for Group R, Division 3 or Group M. Division 1 
Occupancies, provided the building official finds that a special hazard does not 
exist. 
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2. For foundation concrete when the structural design is based on a/fr no greater 
than 2000 psi. 
3. Nonstructural slabs on grade, including prestressed slabs on grade when 
effective prestress in concrete is less than 150 pounds per square inch. 
4. Site work concrete full-supported on earth and concrete where no special 
hazard exists. 
2. DUCTILE MOMENT-RESISTING CONCRETE FRAME: As required 
by Section 2625 (h) of this code. 
3. REINFORCING STEEL AND PRESTRESSING STEEL: A. During all 
stressing and grouting of prestressed concrete. 
B. During placing of reinforcing steel, placing of tendons and prestressing steel 
for all concrete required to have special inspection by Item No. 1. 
EXCEPTION: The special inspector need not be present during entire reinforc-
ing steel-and prestressing steel-placing operations, provided he has inspected for 
conformance with the approved plans, prior to the closing of forms or the delivery of 
concrete to the job site. 
4. WELDING: A. Ductile moment-resisting steel frames. As required by 
Section 2722 (0 of this code. 
B. All structural welding, including welding of reinforcing steel. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. When welding is done in an approved fabricator's shop. 
2. When approved by the building official, single-pass fillet welds when stressed 
to less than 50 percent of allowable stresses and floor and roof deck welding and 
welded studs when used for structural diaphragm or composite systems may have 
periodic inspections in accordance with Section 306 (e) of this code. For periodic 
inspection, the inspector shall check qualifications of welders at the start of work 
and then make final inspection of all welds for compliance prior to completion of 
welding. 
5. HIGH-STRENGTH BOLTING: During all bolt installations and tighten-
ing operations. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. The special inspector need not be present during the entire 
installation and tightening operation, provided he has: 
(i) Inspected the surfaces and bolt type for conformance to plans and specifica-
tions prior to start of bolting. 
(ii) And will, upon completion of all bolting, verify the minimum specified boll 
tension for 10 percent of the bolts for each "type" of connection, for a representa-
tive number of total connections established by the plans and specifications. 
2. In bearing-type connections when threads are not required by design to b( 
excluded from the shear plane, inspection prior to or during installation will not b< 
required. 
6. STRUCTURAL MASONRY: During preparation of masonry wall prisms 
sampling and placing of all masonry units, placement of reinforcement, inspec 
tion of grout space, immediately prior to closing of cleanouts, and during al 
grouting operations. Where the/ ' m is less than 2600 psi and special inspectioi 
stresses are used, test specimens may consist of either one prism test for each 500< 
square feet of wall area or a series of tests based on both grout and mortar for th 
first three consecutive days and each third day thereafter. 
3 
306 UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
EXCEPTION: Special inspection will not be required for structures designed in 
accordance with the values in appropriate tables for noncontinuous inspection. 
7. REINFORCED GYPSUM CONCRETE: When cast-in-place Class B 
gypsum concrete is being mixed and placed. 
8. INSULATING CONCRETE FILL: During the application of insulating 
concrete fill when used as part of a structural system, 
EXCEPTION: The special inspections may be limited to an initial inspection to 
check the deck surface and placement of reinforcing. The special inspector shall 
supervise the preparation of compression test specimens during this initial 
inspection. 
9. SPRAY-APPLIED FIREPROOFING: As required by U.B.C. Standard 
No. 43-8. 
10. PILING, DRILLED PIERS AND CAISSONS: During driving and testing 
of piles and construction of cast-in-place drilled piles or caissons. See Items Nos. 
1 and 3 for concrete and reinforcing steel inspection. 
11. SPECIAL GRADING, EXCAVATION AND FILLING: During earth-
work excavations, grading and filling operations inspection to satisfy require-
ments of Chapter 29 and Chapter 70 (Appendix) of this code. 
12. SPECIAL CASES: Work which, in the opinion of the building official, 
involves unusual hazards. 
(b) Special Inspector. The special inspector shall be a qualified person who 
shall demonstrate his competence, to the satisfaction of the building official, for 
inspection of the particular type of construction or operation requiring special 
inspection. 
(c) Duties and Responsibilities of the Special Inspector. 1. The special 
inspector shall observe the work assigned to be certain it conforms to the design 
drawings and specifications. 
2. The special inspector shall furnish inspection reports to the building official, 
the engineer or architect of record, and other designated persons. All discrepan-
cies shall be brought to the immediate attention of the contractor for correction, 
then, if uncorrected, to the proper design authority and to the building official. 
3. The special inspector shall submit a final signed report stating whether the 
work requiring special inspection was, to the best of his knowledge, in con-
formance with the approved plans and specifications and the applicable work-
manship provision of this code. 
(d) Waiver of Special Inspection. The building official may waive the require-
ment for the employment of a special inspector if he finds that the construction is 
of minor nature. 
(e) Periodic Special Inspection. Some inspections may be made on a periodic 
basis and satisfy the requirements of continuous inspection, provided this period-
ic scheduled inspection is performed as outlined in the project plans and specifica-
tions and approved by the building official. 
(f) Approved Fabricators. Special inspections required by this section and 
elsewhere in this code shall not be required where the work is done on the 
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premises of a fabricator registered and approved by the building official to 
perform such work without special inspection. The certificate of registration shall 
be subject to revocation by the building official if it is found that any work done 
pursuant to the approval is in violation of this code. The approved fabricator shall 
submit a Certificate of Compliance that the work was performed in accordance 
with the approved plans and specifications to the building official and to the 
engineer or architect of record. The approved fabricator's qualifications shall be 
contingent on compliance with the following: 
1. The fabricator has developed and submitted a detailed fabrication procedural 
manual reflecting key quality control procedures which will provide a basis for 
inspection control of workmanship and the fabricator plant. 
2. Verification of the fabricator's quality control capabilities, plant and person-
nel as outlined in the fabrication procedural manual shall be by an approved 
inspection or quality control agency. 
3. Periodic plant inspections shall be conducted by an approved inspection or 
quality control agency to monitor the effectiveness of the quality control 
program. 
4. It shall be the responsibility of the inspection or quality control agency to 
notify the approving authority in writing of any change to the procedural manual. 
Any fabricator approval may be revoked for just cause. Reapproval of the 
fabricator shall be contingent on compliance with quality control procedures 
during the past year. 
Certificate of Occupancy 
Sec, 307. (a) Use or Occupancy. No building or structure of Group A, E, I, H, 
B or R, Division 1 Occupancy, shall be used or occupied, and no change in the 
existing occupancy classification of a building or structure or portion thereof shall 
be made until the building official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy therefor 
as provided herein. 
(b) Change in Use. Changes in the character or use of a building shall not be 
made except as specified in Section 502 of this code. 
(c) Certificate Issued. After final inspection when it is found that the building 
or structure complies with the provisions of this code and other laws which are 
enforced by the code enforcement agency, the building official shall issue a 
Certificate of Occupancy which shall contain the following: 
1. The building permit number. 
2. The address of the building. 
3. The name and address of the owner. 
4. A description of that portion of the building for which the certificate i 
issued. 
5. A statement that the described portion of the building complies with th 
requirements of this code for the group and division of occupancy and tf 
use for which the proposed occupancy is classified. 
6. The name of the building official. 
(d) Temporary Certificate. If the building official finds that no substantj 
307, 3-A UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
hazard will result from occupancy of any building or portion thereof before the 
same is completed, he may issue a temporary Certificate of Occupancy for the use 
of a portion or portions of a building or structure prior to the completion of the 
entire building or structure. 
(e) Posting. The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted in a conspicuous 
place on the premises and shall not be removed except by the building official 
(f) Revocation. The building official may, in writing, suspend or revoke a 
Certificate of Occupancy issued under the provisions of this code whenever the 
certificate is issued in error, or on the basis of incorrect information supplied, or 
when it is determined that the building or structure or portion thereof is in 
violation of any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code. 
TABLE NO. 3-A—BUILDING PERMIT FEES 
TOTAL VALUATION FEE 
Sl.00toS500.00 
S501.00 to 52,000.00 
S2,001.00 to S25,000.00 
525,001.00 to S50,000.00 
550,001.00 to 5100,000.00 
5100,001.00 and up 
510.00 
510.00 for the first S500.00 plus 51.50 for each additional 
5100.00 or fraction thereof, to and including 52,000.00 
532.50 for the first 52.000.00 plus 56.00 for each addi-
tional SI.000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including 
S25,000.00 
5170.50 for the first 525.000.00 plus 54.50 for each 
additional 51.000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including 
550,000.00 
5283.00 for the first S50.000.00 plus S3.00 for each 
additional 51,000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including 
5100,000.00 
5433.00 for the first 5100,000.00 plus 52JO for each 
additional 51,000.00 or fraction thereof 
Other Inspections and Fees: 
1. Inspections outside of normal business hours 515.00 per hour 
(minimum charge—two hours) 
2. Reinspection fee assessed under provisions of 
Section 305 (g) 515.00 each 
3. Inspections for which no fee is specifically 
indicated 515.00 per hour 
(minimum charge—one-half hour) 
4. Additional plan review required by changes, additions 
or revisions to approved plans...' 515.00 per hour 
(minimum charce—one-half hour) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedure 
This appeal arises from a November 3, 1986 Notice and Order 
of the Salt Lake County Building Inspector that the petitioner, 
Robert DeBry, vacate a recently constructed office building in 
Salt Lake County until he had complied with all building code 
requirements necessary to obtain a final certificate of occupancy 
(App. Ill). Mr. DeBry appealed to the Salt Lake County Board of 
Appeals (Building and Zoning) on November 14, 1986. He requested 
relief in the forms of a properly completed building inspection 
and an extension of time for vacating (App. VII). The Board 
conducted a full hearing on December 12, 1986, as recorded in the 
Transcript certified on March 6, 1987. On December 22, 1986, the 
Board issued a final order denying DeBry's requests and affirming 
the order of the building inspector (App. VIII). Mr. DeBry filed 
with this court on January 9, 1987, the docketing statement of 
his petition for review of the Boards firlal order. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On December 13, 1985, the petitioner, Robert DeBry, and his 
wife purchased a recently constructed and substantially completed 
office building located at 4252 South 700 East in Salt Lake City, 
Utah (Tr. 3). On December 6, 1985, shortly before Mr. and Mrs. 
DeBry completed purchase of the building, Salt Lake County issued 
a temporary certificate of occupancy on the builder's assurance 
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that the building would be properly completed. Issuance of the 
temporary certificate was conditioned on the builder's completion 
of relatively minor exterior work (Tr. 4-5; 51-52). 
After closing on the purchase and moving his law offices 
into the building in late December of 1985, Mr. DeBry found nu-
merous construction and system defects. He requested County 
building officials to inspect the building. The County volun-
tarily conducted an inspection on March 17, 1986, and provided 
Mr. DeBry with a letter report on March 19, 1986 (App. I). The 
report notes 22 material defects and calls for Mr. DeBry to sub-
mit corrected building plans and to apply for a building permit. 
Mr. DeBry's communications with the County leading up to the 
March 17, 1986 inspection had established that despite the Coun-
ty's issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy on December 
6, 1985, the building had been constructed with only a permit for 
the footings and foundation (Tr. 4, 50). 
Alarmed by the number of defects noted by the County in its 
March 17, 1986 inspection, Mr. DeBry obtained a separate inspec-
tion by licensed professional engineers. They discovered numer-
ous serious defects, many not noted in the County's March 17, 
1986 report, and concluded that the building was too dangerous 
for occupancy (App. II) (Tr. 5). 
From late September until early December of 1986, Mr. DeBry 
communicated with the building inspector in an attempt to iden-
tify the specific code violations the correction of which would 
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establish full code compliance. Mr. DeBry provided to the County 
copies of the detailed inspection reports of the licensed en-
gineers, retained at his expense. The County refused further 
inspection (App. VI). 
On November 3, 1986, the County issued to Mr. DeBry the 
order to vacate the building and to bring it into full building 
code compliance (App. Ill). 
C. Proceedings Since the January 9, 198J7 Docketing of This 
Petition 
(1) On January 22, 1987, Salt Lake County filed a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion to stay the proceedings 
on appeal. Mr. DeBry replied on February 3, 1987. Meanwhile, on 
January 30, 1987, Mr. DeBry vacated the balding, thus mooting 
his original appeal to the Salt Lake County Board of Appeals for 
additional time for vacating. Accordingly, this petition is now 
limited to the County Board's denial of Mr. DeBry's request for a 
properly completed County building inspection. On February 10, 
1987, Salt Lake County filed a separate motion for summary dis-
position. Mr. DeBry replies to that motion in this combined 
reply and brief on the merits of his appeal. Mr. DeBry believes 
that the County's recent motion for summary disposition, and this 
reply and brief on the merits, effectively supersede the County's 
original motion to dismiss or to stay and Mr. DeBry's reply to 
that motion. 
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D. Related Civil Proceedings 
a. Civil Action for Rescission and Damages, 
On January 24, 1986, Mr. DeBry filed a civil complaint 
for rescission and damages in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District. It is currently docketed as Civ. 
No. C86-553, under a second amended complaint (App. IX) 
received on October 10, 1987. 
The County, its building inspector, and its Public Works 
Department were first named as defendants in the substitute sec-
ond amended complaint, filed on October 6, 1986. 
On December 3, 1986, the County filed a counterclaim against 
Mr. DeBry. The County seeks an order requiring Mr. DeBry to quit 
the premises in accordance with the County's November 3, 1986 
notice and order, and to comply with building permit procedures 
(App. X, 9-12). As noted, supra, Mr. DeBry vacated the building 
on January 30, 19 87, thus mooting the quit premises count in 
the County's counterclaim. 
b. Application for Writ of Mandamus 
On October 16, 1986, approximately two weeks before the 
County issued its November 3, 1986 notice and order, which is the 
genesis of this complaint, Mr. DeBry applied for a writ of man-
damus in the District Court for the Third Judicial District to 
compel completion of the building inspection. The district court 
denied mandamus on November 7, 1986, and filed its written opin-
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ion and order on December 19, 1986 (App. V). Mr. DeBry did not 
appeal from that judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute conferring appellate jurisdiction of the court 
of appeals is ambiguous regarding initial review of the final 
orders of state and local agencies. The Utah Constitution es-
tablishes that appellate jurisdiction of the district courts 
shall be provided by statute. Because the statutory provisions 
governing building inspection and the powers of county boards of 
appeals do not confer review jurisdiction upon the district 
courts, initial review of this petition lies with the court of 
appeals. 
The County's claim, that the order of the district court 
denying mandamus to compel a building inspection disposes of the 
question of whether the County abused its discretionary duty to 
inspect in this case, confuses the issues. In the mandamus pro-
ceeding the only question that could be presented was whether 
further inspection was by law mandatory. The district court 
found that further inspection could not b^ compelled by the ex-
traordinary writ of mandamus. At bar, the question presented is 
whether the County Board abused its discrdtion when it denied Mr. 
DeBry's request for further inspection in its November 3, 1986 
order. 
-6-
Any perceived relationship between the instant case and the 
petitioner's pending civil action for damages is merely superfi-
cial and irrelevant. Mr. DeBry has not put the question of fur-
ther inspection at issue in his civil complaint. The only ques-
tions raised by the petitioner's allegations in the pending civil 
action are whether the County was negligent and fraudulent in 
failing to insure that proper permits and inspections for the 
building had been obtained, and in issuing a temporary occupancy 
certificate for a structure constructed without a building per-
mit. The circumstances of this case and a proper regard for 
judicial economy do not warrant a stay of this petition for re-
view, simply because of the existence of the pending civil suit. 
As for the merits of the instant appeal, the County, having 
voluntarily undertaken and improperly completed an inspection of 
Mr. DeBry's building, is obligated to come back and finish the 
job properly. Mr. DeBry will incur costly architectural and en-
gineering fees if the building must be redesigned and replanned 
without precise indications of which code violations exist. The 
County's egregious violations of its building code procedures in 
this case are now followed by demands that Mr. DeBry comply lit-
erally with the code. This quixotic County posturing is clearly 
arbitrary and capricious. Other County objections to further 
inspection on grounds of design involvement, redundancy and cost 
lack merit. The County has abused its discretion with respect to 
the inspection and should be ordered by this court to finish 
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promptly its earlier inadequate and incomplete inspection of Mr, 
DeBry's building. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OF 
INITIAL REVIEW OF THE FINAL ORDER OF THE SALT 
LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS. 
The jurisdictional statute of the cdurt of appeals provides 
in pertinent part: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdic-
tion, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commis-
sion, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1986). 
The County relies on a nonauthoritative source for the prop-
osition that the statute's intent is that final orders and de-
crees of state and local agencies be reviewed first by the dis-
trict courts with subsequent appeals to the court of appeals. 
See Erickson and Nelson, "To What Court Do I Appeal," 1987 Utah 
Lawyer Alert 14, 15 (Jan. 28, 1987) (Mot. for Disp. 10). 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) does not differentiate between appeals 
from state agencies and appeals from local agencies. This is as 
it should be. With respect to their abilities to act as ad-
ministrative agencies, by issuing orders, rulings, and the like, 
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state and local agencies are indistinguishable from the stand-
point of a party aggrieved by their actions. Under the "last 
antecedent" rule of statutory construction, the words "of them" 
in the phrase "or appeals from the district court review of them" 
should relate to the final decisions of both state and local 
agencies. As stated in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977), the 
"last antecedent" rule is not necessarily limited to 
the one term immediately preceding, but if there are 
several preceding terms of the same character, it may 
modify all of such terms, if the natural and sensible 
meaning of the wording so requires. E.g., a reference 
to horses, cattle, sheep, or any of their young, would 
not mean only the lambs of the sheep, but would mean 
the young of all three classes, colts, calves and 
lambs. 
The court went on to note: 
This is in harmony with another sound and helpful 
rule of construction known as noscitur a sociis (known 
from its associates).6 It would teach that the phrase, 
"or subdivision thereof" following the words "the 
state, or any county" should be taken to mean public 
entities of similar character; and thus a subdivision 
of either the state or any county. 
6
 Heathman v. Giles. 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839 
(1962); Perris v. Perris. 115 Utah 128, 202 P.2d 731 
(1949). 
Id. & n.6. 
Because the present jurisdictional statute uses the disjunc 
tive "or" preceding the phrase "appeals from the district court 
review of them," apparently some final decisions of state and 
local agencies are appealable directly to the court of appeals, 
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while other final decisions must be reviewed initially by the 
district courts. The statute does not suggest on its face a rule 
for identifying the proper avenue of appeal for a particular 
final order, except for the five designated state agencies which 
also are designated in the jurisdictional statute of the supreme 
court, U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(e) (Supp. 1986)\ 
In resolving statutory ambiguity, it is necessary to con-
sider the entire act to discern its meaning and intent. Grant v. 
Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 103, 485 P.2d 1035, 1037 
(1971). The five designated state agencies were noted above. 
The conferrals of court of appeals jurisdiction in U.C.A. § 78-
2a-2(b) through (g) address appeals from criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. These are not directly relevant to appellate jurisdic-
tion over final decisions of administrative agencies. Neither 
§ 78-2a-3 on court of appeals jurisdiction, nor the other sec-
tions of ch. 2a, appears to resolve the proper avenue for appeals 
. . . . 1 
of administrative rulings to the court of appeals except for the 
five designated state agencies. I 
Courts may look to the intention of tfye legislature in re-
solving statutory ambiguity. Matheson v. Crockett, 577 P.2d 948, 
949 (Utah 1978). Because there is a close congruence between 
state constitutional and statutory provisions establishing and 
governing the powers of the courts, the somewhat broader rule 
stated by the court in Monson v. Hall. 584 P.2d 833, 835 (Utah 
1978), is appropriate here: 
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One of the cardinal rules of statutory construc-
tion requires construction with the objective of bring-
ing consonance to Constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, which will be congruous with expressed intent, 
and the applicability of the law in general. 
The constitutional and statutory provisions on district court 
jurisdiction that were in effect before the 1986 creation of the 
court of appeals by statute, each contained, in pertinent part, 
the identical provision: 
The District Court shall have original jurisdic-
tion in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
this Constitution, and not prohibited by law; appellate 
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the same. 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 7, repealed by general election on Nov. 
6, 1984, effective July 1, 1985; U.C.A. § 78-3-4, repealed by 
Utah Laws 1986, ch. 47, § 50 (emphasis added). 
The currently effective constitutional provision on district 
court jurisdiction provides: 
The district court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters except as limited by this con-
stitution or by statute, and power to issue all extra-
ordinary writs. The district court shall have appel-
late jurisdiction as provided by statute. The juris-
diction of all other courts, both original and appel-
late, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters 
filed originally with the supreme court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of orig-
inal jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdic-
tion over the cause. 
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). 
The current corresponding statute on district court juris-
diction, U.C.A. § 78-3-4 (Supp. 1986), no longer restates ver-
batim the jurisdictional clause in the state constitution. Ap-
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peals are not expressly mentioned in § 78-3-4 except for a provi-
sion in § 78-3-4(3), not relevant here, on the relationship bet-
ween district court and circuit court jurisdictions? and cross 
references in § 78-3-4(4) to the jurisdictional statutes govern-
ing the supreme court and the court of appeals: "Appeals from 
the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court 
are under §§ 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3." I 
These cross-references bring the present question of court 
of appeals jurisdiction full circle back to U.C.A. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a) and "the final orders and decrees of state and local 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of them." 
This coursing through past and present constitutional and statu-
tory provisions sheds some light in passing on any apparent am-
biguity perceived in § 78-2a-3 regarding review of final admin-
istrative decisions. 
The former constitutional and statutory provisions, supra. 
expressly conferred on the district courts "appellate jurisdic-
tion from all inferior courts and tribunals." The current con-
stitutional provision, Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5, expressly 
provides that "[t]he district court shall have appellate juris-
diction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate shall be provided by stat-
ute." As noted above, the current district court jurisdictional 
statute, U.C.A. § 78-3-4, is virtually silent on district court 
appellate jurisdiction except for the cross-references to the 
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jurisdictional statutes of the supreme court and the court of 
appeals. 
Mr. DeBry submits that taken together, Utah Const, art. 
VIII, § 5 on district court appellate jurisdiction, and U.C.A. 
§§ 78-2a-3 and 78-3-4 on court of appeals and district court 
jurisdiction, point to a proper construction of "or appeals from 
the district court review of them" in § 78-2-3(2)(a). Where the 
legislature now specifically confers district court review au-
thority over the final orders of a particular state or local 
agency, appeal lies first with district court and then with the 
court of appeals. In all other cases, appeal lies directly from 
the final agency order to the court of appeals. 
An example of current statutory authority for district court 
review of final orders or decrees is U.C.A. § 41-6-44-10(b). It 
provides, upon a driver's license revocation, for the right of 
petition to the district court, confers jurisdiction upon that 
court, and authorizes a de novo proceeding, the highest level of 
scrutiny of an administrative action. See Pledger v. Cox. 626 
P.2d 415 (Utah 1981) (action on review of driver's license revo-
cation) . Another example is in U.C.A. § 17-30-20 (1987), which 
expressly provides for appeal of State Merit Commission decisions 
to the district court. See Matter of Discharge of Jones. 72 0 
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1984) (sheriff's appeal of district court deci-
sion sustaining Merit Commission reinstatement of discharged 
deputy sheriff). 
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There is no provision for district court review of the deci-
sions of building inspectors in U.C.A. § 17-27-12 (1987), which 
authorizes county commissions to enforce zoning regulations 
through building permits. Nor is there a district court review 
provision in U.C.A. § 17-27-16 (1987), which provides for local 
appeals to a county board of adjustment of building permit deci-
sions. 
By virtue of Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5, this court is with-
out the power to confer appellate jurisdiction in this case on 
the district court below. The conferral of such jurisdiction 
must be by statute. Inasmuch as no statute confers such juris-
diction on the district court for review cpf the final order in 
this case, U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) must be read as conferring that 
jurisdiction on this court. Otherwise, Mr. DeBry would have no 
right of appeal whatsoever from the adverse ruling of the County 
Board. 
Our supreme court has stated that "wnere a statute is sub-
ject to more than one construction, we can interpret it to make 
sense and sustain it." Park & Recreation Commission v. Depart-
ment of Finance. 15 Utah 2d 110, 112, 388 P.2d 233, 234 (1964) 
(citing Western Beverage Co. of Provo. Utah v. Hanson, 98 Utah 
332, 96 P.2d 1105 (1940)). 
It makes good sense to construe the jurisdiction of the 
court of appeals to permit direct review of the final orders of 
state and local agencies, except where the legislature has au-
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thorized initial review by the district courts. Any other inter-
pretation would confront petitioners with three potential hur-
dles: the district court, the court of appeals, and the supreme 
court. That prospect does not seem sensible if the legislature 
intended, in creating the court of appeals, to improve access to 
the appellate process, and to make that process more efficient by 
redistributing burdens borne previously by the supreme court and 
the district courts. 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal from 
the final order of the Salt Lake County Board of Appeals (App. 
VIII) . 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF A WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL FURTHER BUILDING INSPEC-
TION IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS ABUSED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN REFUSING TO COMPLETE PROPERLY AN 
INSPECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S BUILDING. 
The County incorrectly claims that the district court's 
ruling on Mr. DeBry's application for mandamus conclusively 
resolved the issue of the County's duty to inspect the building 
completely (Mot. for Disp. 5-7, App. V). In that application 
(App. IV), Mr. DeBry claimed that, under the Salt Lake County 
Building Code, the County had a mandatory duty to complete prop-
erly the inspection of his building. Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Rev. Ordinances tit. II, ch. 1, § 305 (as amended 1966) (herein-
after referred to as the building code). The district court did 
not agree. DeBrv v. Salt Lake County Public Works Department, et 
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al., Civ. No. C86-7874 (Dec. 19, 1986) (App. VIII). Mr. DeBry 
did not appeal. 
When Mr. DeBry filed his mandamus application on October 16, 
1986, he had no other legal recourse to Seek an adequate county 
building inspection. The County's issuance of its November 3, 
1986 notice and order to vacate and to comply with the building 
code (App. Ill) opened an avenue of administrative appeal. Mr. 
DeBry took it by including a request for further inspection in 
his November 14, 1986, appeal to the County Board of Appeals 
(App. VII). This occurred exactly one week after the district 
court had ruled against a mandatory duty to inspect. 
Mr. DeBry appealed to the County Board under the reasonable 
exercise of discretion standard, recognizing a discretionary duty 
to inspect. Mr. DeBry's appeal to the Board was a necessary ex-
haustion of administrative remedies before seeking review in this 
court of whether the County had abused its discretion in refusing 
further inspection. See Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 19, 316 P.2d 549, 551 (1957) 
(corporation action to recover sales taxes paid under protest; 
court noted that "before one may seek a review of the action of 
an administrative body, he must exhaust his administrative reme-
dies and thereby give the agency an opportunity to correct any 
error it may have made"). 
At the Board's December 12, 1986 hearing on Mr. DeBry's 
appeal, the attorney representing the County in Mr. DeBry's re-
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lated civil action for rescission and damages did raise the dis-
trict court's earlier mandamus ruling. The attorney stated his 
opinion that the district court's ruling that there was no man-
datory duty to inspect would justify Board dismissal of Mr. 
DeBry's appeal for further inspection (Tr. 38-43). The Board did 
not dismiss that appeal. It conducted a full hearing of the 
issue. In its discretion the Board ruled that further inspection 
activity would require literal compliance with building code 
procedures: 
Mr. DeBry is to comply with the provisions of Mr. 
Eriksson's letter of November 17, 1986, before any in-
spections need be made by the County. Specifically, 
before any further inspections are made, as-built draw-
ings in sufficient detail, for which a building permit 
could be issued, certified by licensed engineers and a 
licensed architect are submitted to Salt Lake County. 
All required fees are to be paid and a building permit 
issued by the County. 
Not. of Dec. (Dec. 22, 1986) (App. VIII). 
Mr. DeBry in this appeal challenges the reasonableness of 
that Board decision in light of the County's discretionary duty 
to inspect under the facts of this case. 
The County Board heard and ruled on Mr. DeBry's appeal for 
further inspection after the district court had denied the ex-
traordinary writ of mandamus. It is inconsistent for the County 
to claim now that the district court's earlier ruling of no man-
datory duty to inspect disposes of Mr. DeBry's appeal to this 
court under the abuse of discretion standard. In making that 
claim the County is confusing the issue being appealed. 
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The district court's denial of mandamus is not dispositive 
of the issue of abuse of discretion. 
III. THE SUPERFICIAL RELATIONSHIP BET-
WEEN THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW AND A 
PENDING CIVIL ACTION ARISING OUT OF 
THE SAME FACTS DOES NOT WARRANT A 
STAY OF THE PETITION. 
The County incorrectly claims that Mr. DeBry is proceeding 
with the issue of further inspection both in this appeal and in 
his separate civil action for rescission and damages (Motion for 
Disp. 9-12). On a very superficial level there is some connec-
tion between the civil action for damages and the civil proceed-
ing. Both have some relationship with an inspection. The dif-
ferences between the proceedings, however, refute the truth of 
the County's assertions. 
In his civil action Mr. DeBry has alleged counts of negli-
gence, fraud, and deprivations of liberty and property against 
the County Building Inspector, the Salt Lake County Public Works 
Department, and Salt Lake County (App. IX, 20-26). The allega-
tions involve in part the County's past failure to perform any 
inspection, or an adequate inspection. In none of the allega-
tions does Mr. DeBry put at issue the question of future inspec-
tion activity. The reason is practical. The complex, multi-
party civil action may run for several years. Meanwhile, deci-
sions must be made about how to make the building habitable and 
economically productive. Mr. DeBry has attempted first by man-
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damus and then by appeal to the County Board of Appeals to re-
solve the threshold question of precisely what building code 
violations must be corrected to bring the structure into full 
code compliance. 
The instant appeal clearly involves a nucleus of common 
facts giving rise to several related legal actions. Mr. DeBry is 
currently pursuing an action for rescission and damages in the 
district court, and is here appealing from the final order of the 
County Board of Appeals. Earlier, mandamus was applied for and 
denied. Should the County impose criminal sanctions for the 
building's many code violations (§ 205 building code), Mr. DeBry 
would be the defendant in a criminal proceeding. 
The court might consider the example of an airplane crash. 
It would likely spawn three separate types of actions: A crim-
inal action for violation of some criminal statute; an admini-
strative proceeding to revoke a license; and a civil claim for 
damages. All three actions would spring from a common occur-
rence—the airplane crash. All three actions would proceed, 
however, in separate forums for separate purposes. The issue of 
whether the County must complete a proper inspection of Mr. 
DeBry's building is currently joined only in his appeal to the 
County Board of the County's notice and order (App. Ill, VII), 
and in this petition for review of the Board's denial of further 
inspection (App. VIII). 
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The very superficial relationship between this appeal and 
Mr. DeBry's civil complaint scarcely makes the further inspection 
issue an integral part of that complaint. Because it is not in-
tegral, the County incorrectly relies (Mot. for Disp. 11-12) on 
Kennedy v. New Era Industries, 600 P.2d 535 (Utah 1979). The nub 
of the Kennedy court's objection was that the sanctions judgment 
appealed from was not final in the context of the civil proceed-
ing in which it was rendered, and that no| exception to the final 
judgment rule had been met. The judgment of the County Board 
below, however, was final quite apart from Mr. DeBry's pending 
civil action. j 
To grant the County a stay of this appeal would serve only 
one purpose. It would force Mr. DeBry to choose immediately, 
without benefit of this court's ruling, either (1) to undertake 
promptly a rehabilitation of his building without a properly 
completed County inspection report to guide economical redesign 
and replanning; or (2) to let the structure sit vacant and deter-
iorate at increasing economic cost until the civil action reaches 
final judgment. The latter choice would depend, of course, upon 
a stay of any county criminal sanctions for failures to comply 
with the building code while this appeal was stayed. 
For all practical purposes to stay this appeal would not 
merely blunt Mr. DeBry's attempt to obtain a properly completed 
County inspection. It would for all practical purposes defeat 
that attempt. Mr. DeBry cannot risk economically a drawn out 
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resolution of the further inspection issue in the civil actions, 
and the County knows it. 
A stay is an exercise of judicial discretion with regard to 
the circumstances of the particular case. Lauren W. Gibbs v. 
Monson, 102 Utah 233, 245-46, 129 P.2d 887, 892-93 (1942). Both 
the urgent economic circumstances surrounding Mr. DeBry's request 
for further inspection, and the clear separation of that issue 
from the pending civil action, warrant a timely ruling on the 
merits of this petition. 
A stay should not be ordered by this court. 
IV. SALT LAKE COUNTY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ADMINISTERING THE BUILDING CODE WHEN IT 
DENIED THE PETITIONER PROPER COMPLETION OF A 
BUILDING INSPECTION THAT THE COUNTY HAD 
VOLUNTARILY UNDERTAKEN AND IMPROPERLY PER-
FORMED. 
When the Board of Appeals denied Mr. DeBry's request for a 
thorough inspection of his building (App. VIII), it left him 
grasping the horns of a dilemma (Tr. 23-24, 27-28). One horn 
entails costly redesign and replanning of the building unless the 
County reveals specifically which features do not comply with the 
building code. Numerous reiterations of designs and plans will 
be necessary to reach a meeting of minds with the County on code 
compliance. Only then will the County issue a building permit 
for reconstruction. The other horn entails letting the structure 
sit idle until Mr. DeBry's related civil action for rescission 
and damages reaches final judgment. One or more of the parties 
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to that action can then pick up the pieces. This would result in 
unchecked economic losses and neighborhood blight. Furthermore, 
under the County Board's final order directing Mr. DeBry to bring 
the building into code compliance (App. VIII), undue delay could 
result in criminal sanctions (§ 205, building code). 
Economic necessity or criminal sanctions, or both, may soon 
force Mr. DeBry to grasp with both hands the horn of costly re-
design and replanning, unless this court rules that the County 
has abused its discretion by refusing to complete a thorough 
inspection, and orders it to inspect. I 
The County bottoms its refusal to inspect further on the 
technicality that a final building inspection is the last event 
to occur when the building permit process is followed (Mot. for 
Disp. 6). As a general rule, an agency's interpretation of its 
regulations is entitled to judicial deference. Concerned Parents 
of Stepchildren v. Mitchell. 591 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982). On 
the other hand, our supreme court has stated: 
[A]dministrative regulations are presumed to be reason-
able and valid and cannot be ignored or followed by the 
agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence 
of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling 
grounds for not following its rules, an agency must be 
held to them. 
State Department of Community Affairs v. Utah State Merit System 
Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
The County would have this court first ignore the egregious 
departures from building code procedures in the permitting and 
inspecting of Mr. DeBry's building. Then, the County would have 
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the court defer to its position that the same code procedures 
justify a refusal of further inspection when Mr. DeBry has a 
compelling need for precise information on code violations. The 
standard for judging this quixotic exercise of county discretion 
is stated in Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (Utah 1979): 
[I]t is appropriate to reaffirm our commitment to these 
general propositions: that an administrative agency 
should be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion in performing its responsibilities; and that 
the courts should not intrude or interfere therewith 
unless the action is so oppressive or unreasonable that 
it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, or the 
agency has in some way acted contrary to law or in 
excess of its authority. 
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) 
In earlier rulings, the court stated the meaning of ad-
ministrative discretion: 
This broad rule for the limits upon discretion 
vested by the legislature in public officers has been 
further qualified in this jurisdiction: "Discretion, 
when vested in an officer, however, does not mean ab-
solute or arbitrary power. The discretion must be 
exercised in a reasonable manner, and not maliciously, 
wantonly, and arbitrarily to the wrong and injury of 
another." Taylor v. Robertson, 16 Utah 330, 52 
P.l[,]3. 
Murphy v. Grand County, 1 Utah 2d 412, 414, 268 P.2d 677, 678 
(1954) . 
It is fair to ask why the County is now so chary of exercis-
ing its discretion to inspect. Why does it now insist on scru-
pulous observance of every jot and tittle of the building code 
(Mot. for Disp. 6; §§ 301-307, building code)? Mr. DeBry stated 
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to the County Board his strong belief that the County's main 
reason for refusing to inspect further is concern for its legal 
position in the related civil action (Tr. 7). County disclaimers 
to the contrary (Tr. 40), Mr. DeBry remains firm in that belief. 
The County's concern is clearly wrong and misplaced. The pending 
civil action addresses the past. Proper completion of the build-
ing inspection looks to the future. In refusing to inspect prop-
erly , the County abuses its discretion by subordinating to its 
own institutional interests its clear duty of "regulating and 
controlling the design and construction . . . use and occupancy 
. . . of all buildings and structures." (§ 102, building code.) 
Mr. DeBry firmly believes that the County's posture presents 
a situation where "[c]ourts are inclined to look with disfavor 
upon contentions which suggest ulterior purposes." Taylor v. 
Paynes. 118 Utah 61, 66, 218 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1950). Also per-
tinent is the comment of the Supreme Court of Oregon that "where 
there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capri-
cious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even 
though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been 
reached." Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 
Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5, 12 (1958), appeal dismissed. 359 U.S. 436 
(1959) (emphasis added). 
Ulterior purposes and administrative integrity aside, the 
core facts do not support any presumption that the County has 
reasonably exercised its discretion to inspect. On the contrary, 
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there is a clear trail of arbitrary and capricious action cul-
minating in the County's refusal to complete a thorough inspec-
tion: 
1. No building permit was issued to the builder; only 
a permit for footings and the foundation (Tr. 4, 50). 
2. Despite the absence of a building permit the County 
nevertheless conducted inspections of several systems 
at the request of subcontractors (Tr. 4, 51, 55-56). 
3. The County issued a temporary certificate of oc-
cupancy on December 6, 1986, conditioned only upon the 
completion of relatively minor exterior work (Tr. 52); 
and Mr. DeBry relied upon this certificate as assurance 
that the building was substantially in compliance with 
the code (Tr. 4-5). 
4. Mr. DeBry, in response to defects recognized after 
occupying the building, requested a County inspection 
(Tr. 5-6). 
5. The County inspected the building on March 17, 
1986, found a substantial number of features out of 
compliance with the code, and raised, on or about that 
date, the need for Mr. DeBry to apply for a building 
permit and pay the required fees (Tr. 5; App. I). 
6. Mr. DeBry subsequently retained professional en-
gineers to survey the building. Their reports indi-
cated many more and far more serious instances of non-
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compliance with the code than the County had noted in 
its March 17, 1986 inspection (Tr. 5; App. II). 
7. The County's order to vacate the building, with 
which Mr. DeBry has complied, relied mainly on the 
reports of the professional engineers and not on an 
independent County assessment based upon a refinement 
of its March 17, 1986 inspection (Tr. 5-6; App. VI). 
The County's arbitrary and capricious permitting and in-
spection actions have left Mr. DeBry stuck with a physically and 
legally uninhabitable structure. Somehow he must retrofit it 
into code compliance. The magnitude of the compliance task is 
evident in the five required and 12 special inspections pre-
scribed in §§ 305(e) and 306 of the building code. The County 
failed to complete most of those inspections before issuing the 
temporary certificate of occupancy on December 6, 1985. It later 
failed to complete properly the inspection voluntarily undertaken 
at Mr. DeBry's request on March 17, 1986 (App. I). 
Now, when a properly completed inspection would reduce sub-
stantially the costs of redesigning and replanning the structure 
to comply with the code, the County balks. It arbitrarily exer-
cises its discretion to refuse Mr. DeBry the information that 
should have been generated more than a year ago. It refuses to 
provide the thorough inspection report that should have preceded 
its issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy on December 
6, 1986. It refuses to complete the superficial and demonstrably 
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inadequate inspection started on March 17, 1986 (App. I). Having 
missed on two swings at bat, the County now elects to take its 
inspection ball and bat, turn its back on Mr. DeBry, and go home. 
This court should not let the County thus avoid its clear duty of 
fair play. 
In addition to its recently revealed enthusiasm for scru-
pulous observance of permitting and inspection technicalities 
(Mot. for Disp. 7-8), the County ventures three reasons why it 
should not inspect further: 
1. The County would become improperly involved in 
building design. 
2. The inspection would be redundant of the inspection 
conducted by the professional engineers retained by 
DeBry. 
3. The expenditure of additional public resources is 
not justified. 
(Tr. 7-10, App. VI.) 
Improper involvement in building design makes no sense. Mr. 
DeBry seeks no more than what the County should have reported 
before it issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on December 
6, 1985. Had the builder then been held to a proper inspection 
report, he would have had to follow it to bring the structure 
into code compliance. Clearly that would not have been County 
design involvement. If not then, why now? 
Redundancy of the inspections conducted by licensed en-
gineers at Mr. DeBry's expense (App. II) is a make-weight excuse. 
Mr. DeBry seeks the County's specific corroborations of the en-
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gineer's findings. The County already has commented favorably on 
the aggregate quality of the engineers' reports (App. VI, letter 
of Nov. 17, 1986). Besides, some redundancy in matters affecting 
life and safety is no evil. This is particularly true here where 
the cause of redundancy was the County's own failure to follow 
proper permit procedures. 
The County's claim that further inspection means unnecessary 
expenditure of County resources is negated by the County's charge 
of double permit fees where construction has proceeded without a 
proper building permit. In City of Commerce City v. Cooper, 198 
Colo. 553, 609 P.2d 106, 107 (1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 912, 
rehearing denied, 447 U.S. 916 (1980) (action to enjoin property 
owner from conducting business in a residential zone and from 
building without a permit), the court agreed with the city's 
position that double fees were reasonably related to the addi-
tional work and services requiredi 
It is clear that municipalities have the authority 
to impose reasonable fees for building permits in con-
sideration of the costs of services to be rendered in 
the examination of construction plans and specifica-
tions, and to determine that they conform to building 
code regulations. See generally E. McOuillen Fsicl, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed. 1978 Rev. 
Ed.), § 26.201. Commerce City asserts that the ration-
ale for the double fee is to compensate the City for 
the extra work and services required as a result of 
commencement of construction without having first ob-
tained a permit. We do not find this imposition as 
arbitrary or unrelated to the purposes for which a 
building permit fee is exacted. 
609 P.2d at 107. 
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In § 304(d) of the building code the double payment is 
justified for "investigation," clearly implying inspection ac-
tivity. Mr. DeBry told the County Board that he is ready to pay 
the surcharge (Tr. 18). 
Plain reasonableness now demands that the County complete 
properly the inspection started on March 17, 1986. Mr. DeBry 
should not be left to second-guess, at heavy architectural and 
engineering costs, what the County would then have indicated 
about code compliance had it done a proper inspection. Once the 
County belatedly exercised its discretion to inspect on March 17, 
1986, reasonableness demanded competent performance. 
In Weese v. Village of Medina, New York. 83 A.D.2d 989, 443 
N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (1981) (action alleging village negligence for 
issuing building permit and sewer connection permit, when in fact 
no sewer existed in the purported location), the court stated a 
standard for the reasonable exercise of any discretionary func-
tion: "Although a municipality may not be required to provide a 
function merely because it was requested, once it voluntarily 
undertakes such function with the intent of completing it, the 
municipality must act with reasonable care"; accord Manors of 
Inverrary XII Condominium Association. Inc. v. Atreco-Florida. 
Inc., 438 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla. DCA 1983), petition for review 
dismissed, 468 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1984) (action arising out of 
alleged negligence of building inspector in approving plans, 
specifications and constructions which did not meet building 
-29 
code requirements). Similarly, in Robinson v. Citv of Bartles-
ville Board of Education, 700 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 1985) (ac-
tion against school board for injuries resulting from stepping on 
sunken water drain in parking lot; inadequate warning alleged), 
the court noted that "[tjhe municipality has a discretion to do 
or not do a public work or improvement; the duty is, therefore, 
discretionary up to the time that it determined to do the work or 
improvement. After the work is ordered and involves merely the 
execution of a set task, nothing remains for discretion." 
Mr. DeBry urges this court to rule that the County, in 
voluntarily undertaking to inspect his building on March 17, 
1986, was reasonably required to complete the task properly, and 
that by refusing to complete the inspection the County is acting 
arbitrarily and capriciously, and abusing its discretion to in-
spect. By ordering the County to complete a thorough inspection 
and report, this court will enable Mr. DeBry to respond, at rea-
sonable redesign and replanning costs, to the County Board's 
order that he bring the now vacated and idle building into full 
code compliance. This issue is of substantial importance on the 
merits to Mr. DeBry and to similarly situated property owners in 
Salt Lake County and throughout Utah. It should not be dismissed 
under Utah R. ADD. P. 10(a)(2). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of this petition. An 
earlier district court ruling that the County had no mandatory 
duty to inspect does not dispose of the question of whether the 
County abused its discretion in refusing further inspection. The 
superficial relationship between this appeal and a pending civil 
action for rescission and damages does not warrant a stay of this 
appeal. 
On the merits, the County has clearly abused its discretion 
to inspect by its arbitrary and capricious inspection actions, 
culminating in its refusal to complete the inadequate inspection 
conducted on March 17, 1986. Without a properly completed in-
spection report Mr. DeBry faces costly and unnecessary redesign 
and replanning costs in bringing his building into full building 
code compliance. 
The petition prays that this court retain jurisdiction of 
his petition, deny a stay, find that the County has abused its 
discretion to inspect, and order the County to complete properly 
an inspection of his building. 
DATED t h i s / / ? day of _ / M / L /
 1 9 8 7 . 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Appearing Pro Se for Appellant 
By: 
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